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1999 Symposium
Theft Of Art During World War H: Its Legal And
Ethical Consequences
THE JEWISH PERSPECTIVE ON THE THEFT OF
ARTWORKS STOLEN DURING WORLD WAR H
Steven H. Resnicoff
I. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
We have already heard about how secular law approaches
contests over stolen art. Jewish law-which is a coherent legal
system, with axioms, principles, precedents and values-takes a
different approach, and this is what I will focus upon.2 Perhaps
secular law can profit from Jewish law's insights.
Before launching into this subject, though, I want to make a few
comments about what has already been said - or, more poignantly -
what has not been said. The preceding articles have focused
primarily on disputes between the original owners of stolen art and
those who are now in possession. Tragically, however, there is
much stolen art for which there may not be any legal claimants.
Entire families-indeed, entire towns, villages and cities-were
1 Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law; Rabbinic Degree,
Beth Medrash Govoha; Chairperson, Section on Jewish Law, Association of
American Law Schools, 1998-99.
2 Of course, a more comprehensive treatment of the Jewish perspective
would require consideration of various additional questions. For example, is it
likely, on balance, to be either beneficial or harmful to the Jewish community as
a whole (whether in the short-ran or in the long-run) for Jewish individuals or
organizations to pursue recovery of stolen art, reparations for unpaid wages and
similar claims? Does the answer to this question depend on the particular nature
of the claims asserted (stolen art versus unpaid wages), the manner in which the
claims are asserted (politically versus legally), or the persons or entities against
whom the claims are asserted? Second, assuming there were a clear answer to
the first question, to what extent should that answer influence an individual Jew
or Jewish organization in deciding whether to pursue such a recovery?
Admittedly, these are meaningful questions. Alas, the answer to the first (as to
the likelihood of communal benefit of harm) is impossible to divide, leaving a
discussion of the second a bit overly theoretical.
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cruelly liquidated. Distant relatives, if any survived, may be
totally unaware of what specific pieces of art were owned by those
who died. Even where original owners survived, they may simply
lack the requisite proof to establish their prior ownership of the art.
In many of these cases, however, it may be possible to prove that
the art came from some Jewish source-whether from an
individual or from a communal organization, such as a looted
synagogue. As an ethical matter, what should happen to this art?
Should the party in possession (whether a museum or private
collector) be entitled to keep it? Or, instead, should this art be used
to benefit Jews-either Jewish Holocaust survivors, Holocaust
organizations (such as Yad VaShem) or particularized Jewish
communities? The Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg (the
"ERR") had a specific policy of confiscating the art collections of
Jews. If the property was stolen because it was owned by Jews qua
Jews and the property cannot be returned to its owners (because
they perished), perhaps it or its value should be used for Jews. Or
perhaps even the answer to this question should depend on whether
the current possessor of the property sincerely investigated its
provenance before investing in it. After all, this is also part of the
totality of any equitable calculus.
Under the law in many lands, where there is no heir, a decedent's
property escheats to the state. Should this be the rule regarding
Holocaust art? In the case of the Holocaust, a number of
countries-and considerable segments of their citizenries-were
culpably involved, directly or indirectly, in the murderous
elimination of such heirs. Should these countries and citizenries
profit from their war crimes?3
Interestingly, immediately after World War II, the Office of
Military Government, U.S. Zone approved the redistribution of a
significant amount of unclaimed cultural items under American
control to Jewish communities throughout the world by an entity
essentially organized for this purpose, the Jewish Restitution
3 See, e.g., Michael J. Kurtz, Inheritance of Jewish Property, 20 CARDOZO L.
REV. 625, 629 (1998) (mentioning that this argument was raised by Jewish
leaders near the end of World War II).
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Commission.' Similarly, in 1996, the Austrian government
auctioned off unclaimed World War II art in its possession and
used the proceeds for the benefit of Holocaust victims.5 Such
procedures raise difficult questions as to precisely which Jewish
interests should benefit. Nevertheless, it seems at least intuitively
clear that this art be used to promote Jewish interests rather than
non-Jewish interests-especially as to art that has Jewish cultural
significance, such as religious manuscripts or ritual objects or
ornaments.6
II. JEWISH LAW AND THE RECOVERY OF STOLEN PROPERTY
Initially, I should stress that there is an internal Jewish law
doctrine known as dina demalkhuta dina (literally, "the law of the
kingdom is the law"). This doctrine provides that, under certain
circumstances, Jewish law accepts particular secular laws as
religiously binding. The precise parameters of this doctrine are
subject to considerable debate.7 In any event, for our comparative
4 See Michael J. Kurtz, Inheritance of Jewish Property, 20 CARDOzO L. REV.
625 (1998).
5 See Robert Schwartz, The Limits of the Law: A Call for A New Attitude
Toward Artwork Stolen During World War 11, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1,
25-26 (1998).
6 It is also important to note that while this symposium focuses on stolen art,
other types of property were stolen as well. Granted, the problems of proof may
be more difficult regarding such other property, and the possibility of feasible
solutions may be far more complex. Nevertheless, the loss of all types of
property-and their possible ultimate recovery-remain important from any
"Jewish" perspective. Indeed, while lost art may be directly relevant to Jewish
families which were once affluent, the loss of other properties-from homes to
Shabbos candle-holders-was experienced by virtually all European Jewry.
7 See generally, Michael J. Broyde and Steven H. Resnicoff, Jewish Law and
Modern Business Structures: The Corporate Paradigm, 43 WAYNE L.REv.
1685, 1765-1773 (1997); Steven H. Resnicoff, Bankruptcy-A Viable Halachic
Option?, JOURNAL OF HALACHA & CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY XXIV:5 (Fall
1992). Dina demalkhuta dina would not, for instance, legitimize the
discriminatory edicts issued by the Third Reich. For a reference-although an
arguably ambiguous reference-to the application of Dina demalkhuta dina to
the context of returning stolen property, see SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat
353:3. The Shulhan Arukh was authored in the sixteenth century by R. Yosef
1999]
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law purposes, it is more interesting to examine Jewish law's
internal rules. Perhaps they can inform the debate as to what
secular law should be.8
Three fundamental differences stand between the principal
secular law approaches and Jewish law. First, litigation in
common law jurisdictions, such as the United States, usually
centers on statute of limitations issues.9 If there is no statute of
limitations problem, the original owner wins and the party in
possession loses. Under Jewish law, no statute of limitations exists
for the recovery of stolen property.10
Second, litigation in non-common law jurisdictions, including
most European countries, typically revolves around whether the
party in possession obtained the property in good faith, without
knowing or having reason to know that the property had been
Caro. Throughout the years, the views of scores of outstanding commentaries
have been annotated to the Shulhan Arukh which has contributed to its status as
the most central code of Jewish law.
8 For purposes of brevity and clarity my comments about Jewish law's
internal rules may include some oversimplification.
9 See, e.g., Robert Schwartz, The Limits of the Law: A Callfor a new Attitude
Toward Artwork Stolen during World War II, 32 COLuM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1,
4-5 (1998); Laura McFarland-Taylor, Tracking Stolen Artworks on the Internet:
A New Standard for Due Diligence, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
937, 946-951 (1998); Alexandre A. Montagu, Recent Cases on the Recovery of
Stolen Art - The Tug of War Between Owners and Good Faith Purchasers
Continues, 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 75 (1993). See also Lawrence M.
Kaye, Looted Art: What Can and Should Be Done, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 657,
668 (1998) (arguing that Article I of the 1968 Convention on the Non-
Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity, ratified by Russia and a number of Eastern European countries-but
not by the United States or other major Western countries-would prevent the
assertion of statutes of limitations against civil cases to recover plundered art).
10 Various Jewish law sources, old and new, assert that the mere passage of
time does not generally prevent a claimant from successfully asserting his claim.
See, e.g., SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 98:1; R. YEHIEL MICHEL EPSTEIN
(19th-20th centuries), ARUKH HA-SHULHAN, Hoshen Mishpat 98:1; R. EZRA
BASRI (contemporary), DINEI MAMANOT I, at 65-66; R.YAAKOv REICHER
(1670-1733), SHEVUT YAAKOV 111:182; R. YITZCHAK B. SHESHES (1326-1407),
SHUT 404. But see MENACHEM ELON (contemporary), JEWISH LAW: HISTORY,
SOURCES, PRINCIPLES IV, at 1724-1726 (contending that statutes of limitations
have more generally become part of Jewish law).
Vol. X:67
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stolen.' If the property was purchased in good faith, the party in
possession wins and the original owner loses. Under Jewish law,
whether a person acquiring stolen property knows it was stolen is
also important, but its importance is limited.
Third, aside from these doctrinal differences between the Jewish
and secular legal approaches, there is a basic difference as to result.
The secular results, at least as between the party in possession and
the original owner, are "all or nothing." The common law
jurisdictions award "all" to the original owner, while the non-
common law jurisdictions award "all" to the good faith purchaser.
In sharp contrast, Jewish law provides for "compromises."
To explain the Jewish law position, it is necessary to introduce a
new concept, known as ye'ush (despair). Although this concept is
ignored by secular law, it is critical to Jewish law. Ye'ush occurs if
and when the original owner of a piece of property despairs of the
possibility that he or his heirs will ever recover it." Whether
ye'ush has occurred in a particular case can be determined either by
evidence of the owner's express statements or by operation of
law. 3 Someone who has possession of stolen goods can only
convey title to a good faith transferee if there is yeu'ush."4
Consequently, if someone buys stolen goods from a thief and there
is no ye'ush, the buyer does not acquire title even if he made the
purchase in good faith. As a result, the buyer must surrender the
object to its owner. 5 In this way, Jewish law differs from the
secular law of non-common law countries.
11 See generally, the sources cited in note 7, supra.
12 J. DAVID BLEICH, CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC PROBLEMS I, at 352.
13 With respect to some types of property, such as Jewish books or
manuscripts, there may be legal presumptions against a finding of ye'ush. The
applicability of such a presumption in the context of the Holocaust is subject to
a spirited debate. See generally, J. DAVID BLEICH, CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC
PROBLEMS III, at 352-356; R. Simcha Krauss, The Sotheby's Case - A Halachic
Perspective, IX JOURNAL OF HALACHA & CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 5, 10-13
(1985).
14 There is a dispute among Jewish law authorities as to whether such a
transfer of title is effective if the original owner's ye'ush does not occur until
after the transferee took possession.
15 See SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 356:1.
1999]
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To prevent this rule from obstructing commerce by frightening
potential purchasers, ancient Jewish sages decreed that the owner
must pay the buyer the amount the buyer paid for the property. 6 In
the context of stolen art, where market prices may have risen
sharply, this would admittedly impose some burden on the buyer
but only as to the loss of possible profit on the purchase of the
stolen property. Moreover, the buyer has in the meantime enjoyed
possession of the art for free. "
Thus, in a case without ye'ush, (i.e., where the original owner
has not despaired of recovering his property) common law
jurisdictions would rule that the original owner gets the property
back and the good faith purchaser gets nothing so long as there is
no statute of limitations problem. By contrast, non-common law
jurisdictions would say that the good faith purchaser keeps the
property and the original owner receives nothing. Jewish law
provides a compromise. The original owner recovers his property,
and the good faith purchaser, who has enjoyed the property in the
meantime, recovers his purchase price.
What about a bad faith purchaser? Under Jewish law, where
there has been no ye'ush, a bad faith buyer has the same duty as a
good faith buyer to return the property to its original owner. If the
buyer purchased the property knowing that it was stolen, the
original owner is not obligated to compensate the buyer at all." In
fact, someJewish law authorities say this is the case even if the
buyer did not know that the property was stolen so long as the
seller was a known thief. 9 Consequently, as to bad faith buyers
before ye'ush, the Jewish law result approximates that of common
law and non-common law states.
On the other hand, suppose someone in good faith buys stolen
property and there is ye'ush, (i.e., the original owner has despaired
of ever regaining the property). In such a case, the buyer obtains
16 Id. The owner can try to recover from the thief, if he can find him, the
amount the owner has to pay to the buyer.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
[Vol. X:67
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title to the property.2" Just as in a non-common law jurisdiction,
such a buyer would be entitled to keep the property. Nevertheless,
even in this scenario, some Jewish law authorities would require
the good faith buyer to pay the original owner the difference
between the value of the object and the amount that the buyer paid
for it.2 In light of the appreciation in the value of art, as well as
the possibly depressed price paid by the buyer,22 such a rule could
provide the original owner considerable compensation. Thus, at
least according to these authorities, Jewish law again mandates a
compromise, while the secular systems provide for "all or nothing"
results.
Interestingly, however, application of these Jewish law basic
rules would provide that if there was ye'ush, a buyer acquires title
even if he purchased the property knowing that it was stolen, and
he would not technically be obligated to return the property.' Such
a buyer, however, would be required to pay the original owner the
full market value of the property. 4
Up to now, we have surveyed the basic Jewish law rules. There
is, however, an overarching principle that urges Jews to do more
than the minimum required by law. While the corresponding
secular expression might be to go "beyond the letter of the law,"
the Jewish expression is to go "within the scope of the law" (lifnim
mi-shurat ha-din). This phraseology is said to reflect the notion
that the real self is one of kindness. The law defines the maximum
distance a person is permitted to stray from his core values. By
doing more kindness than is technically required, a person draws
closer to his essential self. Under Jewish law, a firmly established
custom has the effect of law. According to a number of authorities,
20 See generally, J. DAVID BLEICH, CONTEMPORARY HALAKHic PROBLEMS
mH, at 352.
21 Id.
22 Because the seller may have been somewhat averse to publicity - lest
claimants learn about the art - the purchase price paid by the buyer may have
been below market value.
23 Of course, in acquiring the property, such a bad faith purchaser would be
guilty of violating the prohibition against buying stolen goods. See, e.g.,
SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 356:1.
24 Id.
1999]
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a custom developed among Jews-arguably based on the lifnim mi-
shurat ha-din principle 2 -that, even in cases in which there was
ye'ush, one who buys stolen property must return it to the original
owner if the owner reimburses him for the amount the buyer paid
for it.26 Although the buyers in such instances technically obtained
title to the stolen goods and were not strictly required to return
them, Jews accepted upon themselves the duty to restore property
to those from whom it was stolen.
Notwithstanding this custom, Jewish law maintains various
reasons why it remains important to determine whether the original
owner experienced ye'ush, (i.e., whether he despaired of ever
regaining possession of his property). For example, it is unclear
whether Jewish law would require non-Jews to comply with this
custom. Jewish law might not compel non-Jews to do more than
the legal minimum. Indeed, assuming that there existed a validly
constituted rabbinic governing authority, it is uncertain whether it
would specifically enforce the custom even upon a Jew or whether
compliance would depend on the individual's voluntary
undertaking to conduct himself in accordance with Jewish law.
III. SPECIAL FACTORS AFFECTING AN ANALYSIS OF HOLOCAUST
The organized theft of art by Nazis during World War II differed
qualitatively from simple theft. From a comparative law
perspective it is interesting to note that although secular legal
discussions do not always account for these differences doctrinally,
Jewish law does. For example,27 Jewish law recognizes that, under
certain circumstances and to a certain extent, ownership rights may
be acquired by the "right of conquest" (kibush milhamah).
Although this doctrine appears irrelevant to some cases of stolen
25 J. DAVID BLEICH, CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC PROBLEMS III, at 367; R.
YAAKOV YESHAYA BLAU (contemporary), PISHEI HOSHEN IV, at 75.
26 SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 356:7; R. YEHIEL MICHEL EPSTEIN,
ARUKH HA-SHULHAN, Hoshen Mishpat 368:4.
27 Another example involves the doctrine of zuto shel yam (literally, the
"flooding of the sea"), whereby people acquire possession of property they save
from imminent destruction. See generally, J. DAVID BLEICH, CONTEMPORARY
HALAKHIC PROBLEMS III, at 362-3 66.
[Vol. X:67
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art, such as when Jews were betrayed by private Gentile collectors
to whom they entrusted their holdings, it seems at least arguably
relevant to some of the organized Nazi confiscations. A number of
subsidiary issues then arise-for instance, whether kibush
milhamah operates even if there is no ye'ush, whether kibush
milhamah applies to actions taken by a government against its own
nationals and whether an equitable obligation exists to return
property which came into one's hands after kibush milhamah."
On a more elementary level, the plight of Jewish refugees is
relevant when evaluating whether the original owners of the stolen
art experienced ye'ush. Although in Talmudic times there were
various general principles as to when ye'ush might be implied by
law, modem commentators suggest that, because of changed
circumstances, those principles are no longer valid. Instead, they
argue that determining whether ye'ush occurred in a particular case
requires a highly fact-sensitive inquiry.29
J. David Bleich is a law professor and a contemporary halakhic
authority. Rabbi Bleich disagrees with Rabbi Isaac Liebes, another
contemporary authority, whether as a matter of Jewish law, one
should generally conclude that Jews caught up in the Holocaust
experienced ye'ush as to Hebrew manuscripts that were stolen
from them. Rabbi Bleich's words serve as apt testimony to the
courage and faith of many of the members of the Holocaust
generation, whose lives-as well as whose art-were so ruthlessly
despoiled.
Rabbi [Isaac] Liebes [author of Teshuvot Bet Avi states]:
In such a state, if they already despaired of their
lives, did they not most certainly [despair] of their
property? To whom would it occur to think
thoughts of his house or fortune while under the
nails of the angel of death, the impure foul
oppressor, in the death camps and in the ghettos?"
Despite its ringing eloquence, this argument is less
28 See generally, J. DAVID BLEICH, CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC PROBLEMS
I, at 356-362, 367-372.
29 R. YAAKOv YEsHAYA BLAu (contemporary), PISHEI HOSHEN IV, at 79.
1999]
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than compelling. The diabolical designs of the
Nazis are now a matter of historical record. But
whether or not they were recognized at the time by
the intended victims is an entirely different matter.
The historical record indicates that the Germans did
everything possible to conceal their malevolent
intentions from both the victims and the world at
large. Moreover, there is certainly every reason to
assume that, even in the darkest hours of the
Holocaust, the oppressed victims hoped and prayed
for the defeat of the Germans at the hands of the
Allies, and hence had reason to anticipate that their
property would eventually be reclaimed by.them or
their heirs. Furthermore, even had the nefarious
"final solution" been announced to the intended
victims, ye'ush would not have ensued. Ye'ush is a
psychological phenomenon and it is unthinkable
that Jews of the Holocaust generation would have
been so lacking in faith as to believe that, in
violation of His covenant with Israel, G-d would
permit the annihilation of the entire Jewish
community. Hence, the unfortunate victims would
certainly have clung to the belief that the plundered
books would ultimately find their way into Jewish
hands. Indeed, that belief has been confirmed by
history. °
As time progresses, the generation of corrupt dealers and
collectors who collaborated with the Nazis will eventually die out
and their holdings, through auctions and the like, will increasingly
pass into the public eye. As information, especially from former
Soviet bloc countries, becomes increasingly accessible, and as
Jewish and non-Jewish organizations utilize technologically
advanced methods of searching and sharing such information, one
can hope-and pray-that history will continue to confirm such
faith.
30 J. DAVID BLEICH, CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC PROBLEMS III, at 355-356.
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